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Chapter 13
Faith as Poiesis in Nicholas of Cusa’s 
Pursuit of Wisdom1
Jason Aleksander
Among the many metaphors that Nicholas uses to explain the conjectural process 
that is involved in all varieties of human intellection, I am partial to one that he 
offers in the Compendium, a work written in 1464, near the end of his life, and in 
which he summarizes his psychology and epistemology. In the first part of this 
passage, Nicholas begins with a metaphor for the process by which the material 
and temporal processes of sensation provide content for intellectual operations.
A completely developed animal in which there is both sense and intel-
lect is to be likened to a geographer who dwells in a city that has the five 
gateways of the five senses. Through these gateways messengers from all 
over the world enter and report on the entire condition of the world … 
[And the geographer] endeavors with all his effort to keep all the gate-
ways open and to continually receive the reports of ever- new messengers 
and to make his description ever more accurate. At length, after he has 
made in his city a complete delineation of the perceptible world, then 
in order not to lose it, he reduces it to a well- ordered and proportionally 
measured map.2
 1 I have been fortunate to have had the opportunity to present versions of this essay in three 
different venues in 2015: (1) the 21st Annual Colloquium of the Société Internationale pour 
l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale, on the topic of “Tolerance and Concepts of Otherness 
in Medieval Philosophy” at Maynooth University, Ireland; (2) a satellite session of the Society 
for Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy at the American Catholic Philosophical Associa-
tion annual conference in Boston, Mass.; and (3) at a colloquium of the Department of Phi-
losophy at Saint Xavier University in Chicago, Ill.. I am grateful both to the organizers of these 
events and to the many interlocutors who provided early feedback on this work. I also would 
like to express my gratitude to Don Duclow and Meredith Ziebart for insightful criticisms 
that have encouraged me to shore up weaknesses in the argument.
 2 Compendium 8, § 22- 23 (h XI/ 3, 17- 18; 1398). Unless otherwise noted, all translations are 
those of Jasper Hopkins in Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Nicholas of 
Cusa, 2 vols. (Minneapolis: 2001). All Latin references are to Nicolai de Cusa Opera omnia 
iussu et auctoritate Academiae Litterarum Heigelbergensis (Hamburg:  1932- 2005) (= h) as 
reproduced by the Cusanus Portal of the Institute for Cusanus Research at the University 
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Although this portion of the passage depicts the root of knowledge as the rel-
atively passive reception of sensation (albeit a passivity that is also an activi-
ty insofar as the geographer must endeavor “with all his effort to keep all the 
gateways open”), the metaphor also suggests that the first activity of the mind, 
properly speaking, is an act of abstraction that constructs a symbolic order, 
the purpose of which is to convey an understanding of the external world. At 
this point in the passage, Nicholas turns his attention from the relationship 
between sensation and mental representation to a reflection on how intellect 
uses mental content to seek to transcend rational limits in the understanding 
of that which lies beyond “the wall of paradise.”3
And he turns toward the map; and, in addition, he dismisses the messen-
gers, closes the gateways, and turns his inner sight toward the Creator- of- 
the- world, who is none of all those things about which the geographer 
has learned from the messengers, but who is the Maker and Cause of 
them all. He considers this Maker to stand antecedently in relation to the 
whole world as he himself, as geographer, stands in relation to his map. 
And from the relation of the map to the real world he beholds in himself, 
qua geographer, the Creator of the world when he contemplates the real-
ity (veritatem) by means of its image (in imagine) and contemplates, by 
means of its sign, that itself which is signified. (Compendium 8, § 23 [h 
xi/ 3, 18- 19; 1398- 99])
While the first part of the passage emphasizes how knowledge of the world in-
volves a representational activity that is rooted in sensation, the second part of 
the passage, however, suggests that the highest function of intellection is locat-
ed in— or is a byproduct of— the attempt to comprehend the nature of divine 
creation on the basis of an analogy to our own poietic endeavors. That is, while 
the first part of the passage emphasizes a creative dimension of the process 
by which we derive knowledge of the world through our own representational 
activities, the second part of the passage seems to indicate that our deepest 
intellectual insights require that we also form a representation to ourselves of 
the very process by which the divine intellect created us in its own image. In 
other words, we best pursue wisdom by understanding our own knowing to be 
of Trier (http:// www.cusanus- portal.de/ ). Citations will be to titles, parts, chapters, and sec-
tions, followed in parentheses by volumes and page numbers in h and page numbers in the 
cited translation. Part, chapter, and section references for all works follow those of h, even 
when these differ from those employed in the translations.
 3 See De visione Dei 9, § 37 (h VI, 35; 697).
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an imitation of the divine intellect’s knowledge of the created world (of which 
we and our knowing are also a part).
Given Nicholas’ situation in the intellectual climate of his time, it is worth 
noting that this epistemology flattens the traditional Aristotelian divisions 
between different species of intellectual disposition as pathways to wisdom4 
so that, for instance, artistic skill is no less a form of knowing than scientific 
knowledge— or, rather, Nicholas treats all intellectual activities as both mimet-
ic and poietic insofar as they involve a process that is both assimilative and 
creative. There are many passages in Nicholas’ prior treatises that bear out this 
reading of the passage from the Compendium, but one indication that Nicholas 
does not denigrate artistic knowing relative to theoretical knowledge is indi-
cated both in the content of as well as in the very fact that he frequently resorts 
to metaphors to articulate his understanding of the conjectural process.5 For 
instance, at the outset of the Idiota de mente, the philosopher is brought to an 
underground dwelling near the Temple of Eternity where he is introduced to 
an idiota (layman) who engaged in the artistic activity of carving a spoon out 
of wood (1, § 54 [h V, 88; 534]). Needless to say, in Nicholas’ text it is the idiota 
who will lead the philosopher in the pursuit of wisdom rather than the other 
way around, and a discussion of the crafting of the spoon becomes an early 
tool in this quest (2, § 62– 64 [h V, 95– 99; 538– 39]).6
 4 Aristotle stipulates in Nicomachean Ethics 6.3 that there are five habits of true thinking: nous, 
epistêmê, technê, phronêsis, and sophia (intellection, scientific knowing, artistic knowledge, 
practical wisdom, and speculative wisdom). Crucially, although Aristotle is explicit in Top-
ics 1.11 that dialectical inquiry begins with the interrogation of doxa (or, more precisely, of 
paradoxa), he does not treat doxa (opinion, belief, or custom) as a habit of true thinking, 
since these may be true or false. As for the five habits of true thinking, Aristotle (along with 
his scholastic interpreters) does maintain hierarchical relationships between these. In the 
first place, of these five, Aristotle only explicitly identifies phronêsis and sophia as virtues. 
Moreover, Aristotle argues in Nicomachean Ethics 6.13 that, although phronêsis is necessary 
for sophia and gives orders to the soul for the sake of obtaining sophia, it does not give orders 
to sophia. I  will argue below that Nicholas dissolves this hierarchy except where wisdom 
(sapientia) is concerned.
 5 The relationship between metaphor and conjecture in Nicholas’ thought receives extensive 
discussion in Clyde Lee Miller’s contribution for this volume.
 6 See K. Meredith Ziebart’s essay in this volume for a more detailed analysis of this passage, 
which concludes by noting that although “it is fair to see in this discussion an emphasis on— 
even valorization of— human creativity … this passage does not imply [that] humans invent 
the forms which they strive through activities like spoonmaking to perfect” {p. ■}. This inter-
pretation of the spoonmaking metaphor is thus rendered in support of Ziebart’s convincing 
argument that although “the mind creates concepts, that creation is fundamentally an act 
of assimilation” {p. ■}. It should be noted, then, that although I generally agree with Zie-
bart’s reading of Nicholas’ epistemology, my essay will tend to emphasize the creative (or 
poietic) rather than the assimilative (or mimetic) aspect of human intellection as it pertains 
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Moreover, especially in later works, such as De ludo globi (1462– 63) and De 
venatione sapientiae (1462– 63), artistic mastery is offered as the paradigm on 
which Nicholas appears to understand scientific knowing, since mastery in the 
case of the sciences is no less than in the case of the arts defined as the ability 
to produce a harmonious ratio that, at best, only represents and approximates 
the formal essence or mode- of- being of the object of intellection. For instance, 
as he puts it in a well- known passage from De ludo globi,
The soul by its own inventiveness creates new instruments in order to 
discern and to know [in the way that] Ptolemy invented the astrolabe, Or-
pheus invented the lyre, and so on. Inventors created these instruments 
not from something extrinsic but from their own minds. For they unfold-
ed their conceptions in a [sensible] material. (De ludo globi ii, § 94 (h ix, 
117; 1232)
Implicitly, the geographer metaphor offers a similar case, and interestingly, 
that it constructs a four- term proportional as its intellectual tool suggests that 
Nicholas may regard all forms of intellection to be simply more or less explicit 
constructions of ratios of this sort. In any case, throughout § 15- 19 of De aequal-
itate (h X/ 1 17- 26; 851- 53) Nicholas addresses the mimetic and poietic processes 
that are at work in all mental activities— a discussion that culminates in the 
following example:
[The situation is] as if grammar, considered in and of itself, were an in-
tellect that knew itself in terms of its own precise ratio, or definition. In 
that ratio, it would know all that could be known [about grammar] or 
that could be externally spoken, or expressed, or set forth. For that ratio 
would encompass, universally and particularly, all such things, howsoev-
er knowable and expressible. Consequently, nothing could be said gram-
matically that would not have to be said in accordance with that ratio 
and in accordance with the expressibility that coincided with that ratio. 
Therefore, every expression would go forth into the perceptible world in 
accordance with its own ratio and its own expressibility, both of which 
were— in the ratio of the grammar— the ratio of the grammar … And 
comparably with what was said about grammar, elevate yourself to ab-
solute mastery, in which every art and every science are enfolded; and in 
to Nicholas’ understanding of the relationships between faith and religious beliefs in the 
pursuit of wisdom.
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like manner note that the ratio of that mastery is just as you have heard 
regarding the ratio of grammar.7
As a consequence of this epistemological/ hermeneutic theory, Nicholas con-
fronts us with the question of how our beliefs and social customs convey or 
manifest the deeper intellectual truths out of which they are produced. On 
the one hand, because our mental activities depend upon the representation-
al process that generates a symbolic order through which we understand the 
world, our understanding is largely beholden to the sorts of conventional signs 
that allow us to communicate with one another about the world.8 Yet, on the 
other hand, we certainly have reason to be suspicious of the potential for be-
liefs and rites to stimulate the hunt for wisdom because, even when the stakes 
are high, we are not always attentive to the arbitrariness of the relationship 
between our beliefs, signs, and rites, and the truths that these manifest. This 
could not be clearer than it is in the conclusion of the archangel’s lament that 
sets in motion the dialogue of De pace fidei:
It is a characteristic of the earthly human condition that a longstand-
ing custom which is taken as having become nature is defended as truth. 
Thus not insignificant dissensions occur when each community prefers 
its faith to another. Therefore come to our aid you who alone are able. For 
this rivalry exists for the sake of you whom alone they revere in every-
thing that all seem to worship.9
But, if it is the case that religious rites and beliefs (and other species of cus-
tom and belief as well) are often obstacles rather than tools in our pursuit of 
 7 De aequalitate § 18- 19 (h X/ 1, 23- 25; 852- 53). Translation altered where Hopkins renders vari-
ous cases of ratio as “form.”
 8 Nicholas articulates this point in various works, but the first few chapters of the Compendium 
provide a succinct summary of his view. In support of the claims above, consider the follow-
ing passage: “Signs which have been arbitrarily and conventionally instituted for designating 
[objects], are made known (to those to whom the convention is foreign) only by means of a 
contrivance or instruction. And since all signs by means of which knowledge is to be hand-
ed down must be known to both teacher and students, the first instruction will be about a 
knowledge of such signs. This instruction is first because without it no [knowledge] can be 
handed down and because in the perfection of the knowledge of signs there is included all 
[knowledge] that can be handed down” (2, § 5 [h XI/ 3, 6; 1388]).
 9 1, § 1.4- 5 (h VII, 6). All translations of De pace fidei are from the text provided in James 
E.  Biechler and H.  Lawrence Bond, eds., Nicholas of Cusa on Interreligious Harmony:  Text, 
Concordance, and Translation of De pace fidei (Lewiston, NY: 1990). Pagination in the transla-
tion follows h.
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wisdom, then we are left with a difficult question concerning the nature of the 
relationships between true faith as a path to the highest wisdom and the ways 
in which diverse religious beliefs and practices function as potential manifes-
tations of that true faith.
To draw out Nicholas’ peculiar understanding of the relationships between 
religious beliefs/ rites and the true faith that he regards as the only pathway to 
the highest wisdom, this essay proceeds in three steps. First, to describe Nich-
olas of Cusa’s basic understanding of the relationship between diverse rites/ 
beliefs and faith, I will provide an overview of how Nicholas explores these in 
De pace fidei. My main intention in this section of the paper will be to provide 
a preliminary definition of faith by identifying the principles by which Nich-
olas attempts to adjudicate the question of the legitimacy of various diverse 
religious practices. In the second section, I will turn to some of Nicholas’ lat-
er speculative works to explore how Nicholas’ psychology and philosophy of 
history undergird his approach to the question of the relationship between 
rites/ beliefs, faith, and the pursuit of wisdom. In this section, I will argue that, 
for Nicholas, in all of our mental activities— whether practical or theoretical; 
whether artistic, scientific, or religious— the soul poietically produces even 
while it also discerns, perceives, or assimilates harmonies in its self- constituting 
activities. In the concluding section, I will return to some lingering problems 
encountered in De pace fidei in order to grapple with the practical implications 
of Nicholas of Cusa’s understanding of true faith as a habit of mind that makes 
use of religious rites or beliefs in a way that sustains or develops one’s potential 
for poietic, self- creating activities.
I The Relationship between Faith, Religious Rites, 
and the Pursuit of Wisdom in De pace fidei
De pace fidei is certainly not the only work in which Nicholas discusses the 
relationships between religion, faith, and the pursuit of wisdom; it is, however, 
arguably the most poignant, since it was written in 1453 in direct response to 
the fall of Constantinople— a fact that is revealed in the opening sentence of 
the work:
After the brutal deeds recently committed by the Turkish ruler at Con-
stantinople were reported to a certain man, who had once seen the sites 
of those regions, he was inflamed by a zeal for God; with many sighs he 
implored the Creator of all things that in his mercy he restrain the perse-
cution, raging more than ever because of different religious rites.
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Yet while the reader of De pace fidei is initially encouraged to think of the work 
as a response to that specific historical event, Nicholas quickly moves on to 
reframe the rest of the dialogue by taking it out of the temporal realm altogeth-
er. Immediately following the opening lament, Nicholas begins to construct a 
literary space in which he offers an imagined discussion that takes place at an 
“intellectual height” (1, § 2 [h vii, 4])— or, as he puts it later, in “the heaven of 
reason” (19, § 68 [h vii, 62])— between the Incarnate Word (Verbum/ Logos10), 
St Peter, St Paul, and seventeen (identified) “eminent men of this world” (3, § 9 
[h vii, 10]) representing diverse provincial customs. In all, the seventeen repre-
sentatives with speaking parts include a Greek, an Italian, an Arab, an Indian, 
a Chaldean, a Jew, a Scythian, a Frenchman, a Persian, a Syrian, a Spaniard, a 
German, a Tartar, an Armenian, a Bohemian, an Englishman, and, although 
he is only given one sentence in the entire De pace fidei, a Turk (see 4, § 47 [h 
vii, 44]).
Throughout this work, Nicholas’ explicit aim is to argue for the thesis that, 
by means of interreligious dialogue, “a single easy harmony could be found and 
through it a lasting peace established by appropriate and true means” between 
the diverse religions of the world (1, § 1 [h vii, 4]). As should already be clear 
from the introduction to this essay, Nicholas treats all of our mental acts— 
including all acts of signification— as processes of intellection. It is for this 
reason that Nicholas regards all religious rites and doctrines as special cases of 
the ways in which all mental habits may be regarded as the contracted signs 
of the same unified truth that is presupposed as their transcendent origin. The 
trouble, of course, is that, as we have seen from the archangel’s lament, in the 
case of diverse religious rites and beliefs, the worldly manifestations of this 
presupposed truth are often sources of conflict, ignorance, and servitude rath-
er than of free, harmonious self- knowing.
As I have discussed elsewhere,11 also worth noting is that the “appropriate 
and true means” that Nicholas has in mind for establishing peace in the world 
seem to be qualified by his implicit admission that only those who are “vigor-
ous in intellect” are capable of understanding that “there is one religion and 
worship, which is presupposed in all the diversity of rites” (6, § 16, [h vii, 16]). 
 10 In De pace fidei, Nicholas typically signifies Christ with Verbum. But in 10, § 27 (h VII, 28- 
29), for instance, Nicholas makes explicit the notion that, in this sense, Verbum should 
be understood as identical to Logos: “Reason, which is the Logos or Word [Verbum], em-
anates from that which speaks it so that when the Omnipotent speaks the Word, those 
things which are enfolded in the Word are made in reality.”
 11 “The Problem of Temporality in the Literary Framework of Nicholas of Cusa’s De pace 
fidei,” Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 1, 2 
(2014), 135- 45.
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Therefore, Nicholas also seems to admit that the “single easy harmony” can be 
achieved only under the condition that there are, simultaneously among the 
diverse religions of the world, enlightened rulers or prophets who recognize, 
encourage, and participate in dialogue. And, moreover, it would only be under 
the peaceful conditions established by these enlightened rulers and prophets 
that there would also be good reason for the hope that reason might lead “all 
diversity of religions … to one orthodox faith” (3, § 8 [h vii, 10]).12
In part because of these hints that Nicholas himself had misgivings about 
the practical efficacy of interreligious and ecumenical dialogue,13 it is difficult 
to square Nicholas’ explicit attempts to reconcile his own apparent presup-
positions that, on the one hand, all religious rites and beliefs are manifesta-
tions of the one true faith underlying them all and his insistence that, on the 
other hand, some specific rites or beliefs— e.g., baptism and belief in the pos-
sibility of individual immortality— are so intimately associated with the one 
transcendently unified faith that they are not merely optional but are, rather, 
required for entrance into the one true faith. In fact, there is a fundamental 
ambiguity in De pace fidei’s deployment of terminology concerning the rela-
tionships between rites/ beliefs/ practices, religion/ religions, and faith/ faiths. 
As I have noted above, 1, § 4- 5 (h vii, 6) seems to imply that there are multiple 
faiths, since particular political communities favor their own faiths to that of 
others. However, in another formula cited above (3, § 8 [h vii, 10]), Nicholas 
emphasizes that the dialogue seeks to identify and/ or produce a unified, or-
thodox faith (unam fidem orthodoxam) that is expressed through a diversity of 
religions (religionum diversitas). But the formula that seems to guide Nicholas’ 
 12 In relation to the rhetorical strategies of De pace fidei and other works, see especially the 
discussions of Nicholas’ reliance on a conception of the methods of “manuduction” (lead-
ing by the hand) and interpretatio pia in James E. Biechler, “A New Face toward Islam: Nich-
olas of Cusa and John of Segovia,” in Nicholas of Cusa in Search of God and Wisdom, eds. 
Gerald Christianson and Thomas M. Izbicki (Leiden: 1991), pp. 185- 202; Biechler, “Inter-
religious Dialogue,” in Introducing Nicholas of Cusa: A Guide to a Renaissance Man, eds. 
Christopher M. Bellitto, Thomas M. Izbicki, and Gerald Christianson (New York: 2004), 
pp. 270- 96; and Gergely Tibor Bakos, On Faith, Rationality, and the Other in the Late Middle 
Ages: A Study of Nicholas of Cusa’s Manuductive Approach to Islam (Eugene: 2011).
 13 Although the evidence of Nicholas’ epistolary communication with Juan de Segovia sug-
gests that Nicholas did believe that some variety of interreligious dialogue could serve 
as a practical and expedient means of achieving peace, Nicholas in no way suggests that 
the specific methods one should employ ought to be modeled on the fictional conver-
sation that is depicted in De pace fidei. Indeed, as Biechler pointed out, in his 1454 letter 
to Segovia Nicholas explicitly recommended that the Christian side of any interreligious 
conferences “be placed in the hands of influential laymen rather than priests because, he 
said, the Turks would prefer these” (“A New Face toward Islam,” p. 200).
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usage most frequently in De pace fidei occurs in 6, § 16, (h vii, 16)— also cited 
above— where Nicholas seems to maintain that one religion and worship (una 
est religio et cultus) is presupposed by the diversity of rites (diversitate rituum).
In other words, it is not entirely clear whether Nicholas intends to maintain 
that there is one faith or many faiths, nor is it clear whether it is one religion 
or many that align with a true or orthodox faith. Perhaps he means that there 
is only one special configuration of rites that can be considered an “orthodox 
faith.” If so, then perhaps he means that, among all the various religions, there 
can be only one religion that maximally manifests or produces this orthodox 
faith. And yet, if faith is also to be understood as a mental disposition that 
orients us toward wisdom, then it does not seem to me that Nicholas would 
wish to maintain that only a single orthodox faith has the capacity to nurture 
that pursuit. For this reason, I will call “true faith” any variety of faith, whether 
orthodox or not, that orients the intellect toward wisdom. True faith, then, is a 
“faith seeking understanding,” to borrow Anselm’s formula.
Even if De pace fidei’s terminology governing the relationship between re-
ligion and faith is murky, what is clear is that the fundamental problem of De 
pace fidei is to adjudicate the question of the relative legitimacy of various 
diverse rites and religious beliefs as tools for the development of true faith. 
Consequently, in this essay, simply for the purposes of eliminating more com-
plicated expressions that would require awkward references to “rites and be-
liefs,” I will sometimes refer to clusters of temporal religious rites and beliefs 
as “religions” and so will concern myself with the question of the legitimacy of 
various religions as collections of particular rites and beliefs that arise in dif-
ferent historical circumstances. Thus, part of my intention is to try to identify 
a consistent definition of “true faith” by reference to the question of the prin-
ciples by which Nicholas attempts to adjudicate the question of the legitimacy 
of diverse religions.
In any case, what is both troubling and interesting about these ambiguities 
in De pace fidei’s terminology is that, by employing them in an effort to estab-
lish principles for adjudicating the question of the legitimacy of diverse reli-
gions, the text seems to be held in tension between its apologetic aims and its 
ecumenical ones. For instance, Nicholas’ interpreters are generally in agree-
ment that the manuductive process by which the representatives of Islam are 
led to agreement with the Word and its apostolic representatives is, at the very 
least, open to criticism— especially if we read De pace fidei in light of the less 
conciliatory Cribratio Alkorani.14 Moreover, the text’s treatment of Judaism is 
 14 See, however, John Monfasani’s essay in this volume, where a case is made for the claim 
that De pace fidei is less conciliatory than Cribatio Alkorani.
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hardly innocent of the sort of apologetic excesses that should make most con-
temporary academic theologians blush. Even leaving aside Nicholas’ record as 
a papal legate,15 it is difficult to square Nicholas’ apparent ecumenism with 
the fact that the imagined discourse of De pace fidei denies the representa-
tive of Judaism the one thing that every other participant achieves. For, when 
the Jewish interlocutor is depicted as reluctant to acknowledge and accept the 
mystery of Incarnation, the Persian points out that “it will be more difficult to 
bring the Jews than others to this belief for they admit nothing expressly about 
Christ.” Even more telling, to this remark, Peter simply responds:
[T] hey have all these things in their scriptures about Christ; but following 
the literal sense they [refuse] to understand (intelligere nolunt). Never-
theless, this resistance of the Jews will not impede concord. For they are 
few and will not be able by arms to disturb the whole world. (12, § 41 [h 
vii, 39], my emendation)16
In other words, on the one hand, De pace fidei appears to offer a definition 
of faith that acknowledges different religions as points of legitimate access. 
On the other hand, the text is also haunted by its apologetic aims insofar as 
it regards other religions as true only to the extent that their rites point to the 
superior mode of faith that is manifested by Christianity. But held in tension 
between these two impulses, the text does not offer sufficient guidance about 
the grounds for the legitimacy of particular rites in particular hermeneutic and 
political contexts. Ultimately, the logic seems to be that non- Christian rites 
may be preferred in some particular political contexts because they are expe-
dient for producing the sort of peace that would be required to cultivate other 
virtues and thereby lead to a greater likelihood of conversion to Christianity. 
Consequently, the doctrines that receive the greatest degree of discussion are 
those that Nicholas regards as most significant to the intellectual content of 
Christianity— namely, rites and beliefs concerned with the Trinity, Incarna-
tion, and the possibility of individual immortality. But beyond this generality, 
 15 For a discussion of Nicholas’ legatine decrees against Jews, see Thomas M. Izbicki, “Nich-
olas of Cusa and the Jews,” in Conflict and Reconciliation: Perspectives on Nicholas of Cusa, 
ed. Inigo Bocken (Leiden: 2004), pp. 119- 30.
 16 In light of St Peter’s comment here as well as what I take to be Nicholas’ interpretation of 
the Jewish practice Kiddush HaShem in 15, § 53 (h VII, 50), I have argued in other contexts 
that Nicholas’ anti- Jewish sentiments constitute a betrayal of his own apologetic strategy 
in De pace fidei. See “ ‘But following the literal sense, the Jews refuse to understand:’ Her-
meneutic Conflicts in the De pace fidei,” American Cusanus Society Newsletter 31 (2014), 
13- 19.
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Nicholas leaves open the question of how to evaluate the legitimacy of other 
particular rites.
For instance, Nicholas’ depiction of St Paul seems to waver considerably 
on the question of circumcision in De pace fidei § 16.60 (h vii, 55- 56). When 
the Tartar expresses “grave doubts” that the Tartars will accept circumcision, 
at first Paul says that “accepting circumcision has no bearing on the truth of 
salvation” because there can be salvation without it. Next, Paul allows that 
even those who acknowledge that circumcision is not necessary for salvation 
are not condemned on account of circumcision provided that they maintain 
true faith. But then Paul provides arguments that suggest that, for the sake of 
peace, either the minority should give up the practice to be in conformity with 
the majority or the majority should conform itself to the minority in receiving 
circumcision. And finally, he concludes that, since it does not seem likely that 
either party will conform to the rites of the other, both parties should simply 
tolerate one another’s rites.
Notwithstanding that this does not address the Tartar’s bafflement that any 
Christians would willfully practice circumcision, Paul’s answer also depends 
upon a fabricated scenario in which both parties tolerate one another on the 
basis of an understanding that circumcision is not a rite that expresses an in-
timate relationship to faith— which, of course, simply begs the question (in 
the context of De pace fidei, anyway) of why Paul does not consider this rite 
to be as intimately linked to true faith as, for instance, marriage. Indeed, the 
very argument to which Paul briefly gestures on behalf of Christian marriage 
conventions in 19, § 67 (h vii, 61)— that monogamous heterosexual marriage is 
to be preferred to polygamous and non- heterosexual practices as an allowance 
for human weakness that redirects human impulse away from a greater sin of 
unbridled cupidity toward greater purity— is similar to various historical jus-
tifications for the practice of circumcision— namely, that by dampening gen-
ital sensation, circumcision discourages lasciviousness.17 And yet, while Paul 
seems to regard the moral benefits of marriage as being so significant that con-
formity rather than diversity of rites ought to be established, he seems com-
fortable with a great deal of diversity in the sensible signs and religious prac-
tices associated with the sacrament of the Eucharist (18, § 66 [h vii, 60- 61]).
My point in offering these brief examples is not that the reasons Nicholas 
gives for expecting more or less conformity in any particular rite are unintelli-
gible or invalid. Rather, my point is that, even when the reasons are relatively 
 17 Maimonides, for instance, offers this as one of the key reasons for practicing circumcision 
in Guide for the Perplexed III, 49.
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clear in relation to particular rites that are discussed in the dialogue, they do 
not always seem to depend upon the same sorts of considerations. In other 
words, the various inconsistencies in the ways in which Nicholas treats vari-
ous rites as well as the cursory nature of some of the examinations indicate 
that Nicholas is to some extent reticent to provide an explicit articulation of 
the apologetic grounds on which he justifies the hierarchical relationships be-
tween these rites and the primary legitimacy of the central tenets of his inter-
pretation of Christianity.
The upshot of this reticence is that interpreters are left with more than one 
strategy for responding to De pace fidei. For instance, the question of the le-
gitimacy of various rites can be settled by interpretations that reinforce the 
centrality of its Christological metaphysics.18 However, the same vacillations 
that permit these more apologetic interpretations of the text also leave open 
the possibility of approaches that emphasize Nicholas’ pluralism or, at the 
very least, his hesitancy in the face of contrary impulses.19 I think both sorts 
 18 Among studies that emphasize the fundamental Christology of De pace fidei, see especial-
ly Knut Alfsvåg, “Divine Difference and Religious Unity: On the Relation Between De doc-
ta ignoranita, De pace fidei, and Cribatio Alkorani,” in Nicholas of Cusa and Islam: Polemic 
and Dialogue in the Late Middle Ages, eds. Ian C. Levy, Rita George- Tvrtković, and Donald 
F. Duclow (Leiden: 2014), pp. 49- 67; Walter A. Euler, Unitas et Pax: Religionsvergleich bei 
Raimundus Lullus und Nikolaus von Kues (Würzburg: 1990); Joshua Hollman, “Reading De 
pace fidei Christologically: Nicholas of Cusa’s Verbum Dialectic of Religious Concordance,” 
in Levy et al., Nicholas of Cusa and Islam, pp. 68- 85; and Joshua Hollmann, The Religious 
Concordance: Nicholas of Cusa and Christian- Muslim Dialogue (Leiden: 2017). Monfasani’s 
essay for this volume, “Cusanus, the Greeks, and Islam,” argues that De pace fidei, unlike 
Cribatio Alkorani, is a work in the vein of Christian apologetics. However, it is also clear 
that Monfasani, unlike the studies cited above, also regards De pace fidei as a “deeply 
flawed work” because of its apologetic strategy. Marica Costigliolo emphasizes the apol-
ogetic nature of both De pace fidei and Cribatio Alkorani, but her work stresses how these 
treatises are indicative of the development of Nicholas’ views in response to the concrete 
historical context in which they were written. See Islam e Cristianesimo: mondi di differen-
ze nel Medioevo: Il dialogo con l’Islam nell’opera di Nicola da Cusa (Genoa: 2012); and The 
Western Perception of Islam between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance:  The Work of 
Nicholas of Cusa (Eugene: 2017).
 19 Among interpreters who emphasize the significance of the tension between De pace fi-
dei’s apologetic and ecumenical impulses, see, for instance, Bakos, On Faith, Rationality, 
and the Other in the Late Middle Ages; Jos Decorte, “Tolerance and Trinity,” in Conflict and 
Reconciliation, pp.  107- 17; Paul Richard Blum, “Truth, Violence, and Peace According to 
Nicholas of Cusa,” American Cusanus Society Newsletter 33 (2016), 29- 35; Birgit H. Heland-
er, Nicolaus Cusanus als Wegbereiter auch der Heutigen Ökumene (Uppsala: 1993); Thomas 
P. McTighe, “Nicholas of Cusa’s Unity- Metaphysics and the Formula Religio una in ritu-
um varietate,” in Christianson and Izbicki, Nicholas of Cusa in Search of God and Wisdom, 
pp. 161- 72; and Markus Riedenauer, Pluralität und Rationalität: Die Herausforderung der 
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of interpretation are potentially valid as far as De pace fidei itself is concerned. 
However, my specific aim in what follows is to clarify De pace fidei’s tacit un-
derstanding of the relationship between religion and faith by appealing to 
speculative works that otherwise provide only an oblique angle on the ques-
tion of the legitimacy of non- Christian rites. The import of this analysis will be 
to highlight the value and meaningfulness of the tensions within De pace fidei’s 
contrary impulses rather than attempt to offer a synthesis or direct refutation 
of other interpretations.
ii Human Psychology and the Philosophy of History 
in Nicholas of Cusa’s Later Treatises
Precisely because the arguments of De pace fidei rest on the premise that all 
religions are products of the unique historical circumstances from which they 
originate, discussing the philosophy of history that is articulated in some of 
Nicholas’ later philosophical treatises may provide us with an important sup-
plemental resource for considering the question of the legitimacy of partic-
ular religions as manifestations of faith. Therefore, although I  will return to 
a discussion of De pace fidei in the concluding section of this essay, in order 
to undertake an analysis of Nicholas’ underlying philosophy of history, this 
section will focus mainly on two late works that were written as companion 
“sermons” in the first half of 1459.20 These texts, which Nicholas apparently 
did not title but which we today refer to as De aequalitate and De principio, 
are each devoted to a theme text from the Gospel of John,21 and both texts are 
fundamentally concerned with reflections on eternity and on the mystery of 
the Incarnation.22
Vernunft durch religiöse und kulturelle Vielfalt nach Nikolaus Cusanus, Theologie und Frie-
den 32 (Stuttgart: 2007).
 20 De Principio references De aequalitate in § 21 and § 30. Indeed, even if these two rela-
tively brief texts are not sermons in the ordinary sense of the term, Nicholas referred to 
them as sermones and seemed to offer them as discourses on the themes treated in his 
other sermons. For a discussion of the place of these treatises in Nicholas’ oeuvre, see Ed-
ward Cranz, “De aequalitate and the De principio of Nicholas of Cusa,” in Nicholas of Cusa 
on Christ and the Church, eds. Gerald Christianson and Thomas Izbicki (Leiden:  1996), 
pp. 271- 80.
 21 De aequalitate’s theme text is John 1:4: “The life was the light of men;” De principio’s is John 
8:25: “ ‘Who art Thou?’ Jesus answered them: ‘the Beginning— I who, indeed, am speaking 
unto you.’ ”
 22 For a discussion of how this theme is explored in De ludo globi and De venatione sapien-
tiae, see Donald Duclow, “Tempus— Aeternitas— Perpetuum:  ‘Eternal Time’— Nicholas 
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In De principio, Nicholas begins with a fairly commonplace argument that 
the world cannot be self- caused and that therefore there can be only one nec-
essary beginning from which all existents are caused (§ 2- 7 [h X/ 2b, 3- 7; 880- 
82]). From this relatively familiar argument, however, Nicholas soon departs 
in order to follow a more or less Proclusian argument23 based in the following 
definitions:
Since the beginning (principium) is the beginning, it is eternal and what-
ever things are seen in eternity are eternity. Hereupon you will recognize 
that in eternity there cannot be a beginning without there being that 
which is begun … Know, as well, that eternity must not be considered to 
be a kind of extended duration, as it were, but must be thought of as, at 
once, totality- of- being, which is the beginning. Therefore, when eternity 
is considered to be the beginning, then our speaking of the beginning of 
the begun is nothing but our speaking of the eternity of the eternal or our 
speaking of the eternity of the begun. (§ 10 [h X/ 2b, 11- 12; 883])
In other words, according to Nicholas, the Beginning is not prior in time 
to the world but is prior ontologically. In fact, the Beginning does not exist 
in the proper sense of the term, since it is prior to all affirmation (§ 24 [h 
X/ 2b, 35;  890]).24 Hence, for Nicholas, creation is not in time, but rather 
of Cusa on World, Time and Eternity,” in Manuductiones: Festschrift zu Ehren von Jorge 
M. Machetta und Claudia D’Amico, ed. Cecilia Rusconi (Münster: 2014), pp. 211- 21; Mathieu 
van der Meer, “World without End: Nicholas of Cusa’s View of Time and Eternity,” in Chris-
tian Humanism: Essays in Honour of Arjo Vanderjagt, eds. Alasdair A. MacDonald, Zweder 
R.W.M. von Martels, and Jan R. Veenstra (Leiden: 2009), pp. 317- 37; and Iris Wikström, 
“The Notion of Time in Cusanus’ Work De ludo globi,” in Eriugena Cusanus, eds. Agniessz-
ka Kijewska, Roman Majeran, and Harald Schwaetzer (Lublin: 2011), pp. 249- 63.
 23 The references to Proclus are explicit in both De principio and De aequalitate, but Nicho-
las also remains deeply indebted (even if less explicitly acknowledged) to Augustine and 
Boethius in these texts. For further discussion of the influences of Augustine on Nicholas’ 
philosophy of time, see Norbert Fischer, “Cusanus’ Concept of God and Man in the Light 
of His Reflections on Time,” trans. Peter Casarella, Ultimate Reality and Meaning 15 (1992), 
252- 74; for the influence of Boethius, see Jean- Michel Counet, “Le temps come l’explica-
tion de l’éternité chez Nicolas de Cues,” Revue philosophique de Louvain 101 (2003), 319- 39; 
for the influence of Proclus as well as a detailed discussion of De aequalitate, see Eliza-
beth Brient’s contribution to this volume.
 24 Nicholas provides a variation on this theme in De ludo globi § 87, where the cardinal ad-
monishes Albert that he is mistaken for believing that God has existed from eternity: “For 
it is not possible that something existed but that time did not yet exist, since ‘existed’ is 
indicative of past time. Time is eternity’s creature; for time is not eternity, which is pres-
ent as a whole at once, but is the image of eternity, since it consists of successiveness” (h 
IX, 107; 1228).
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time, as the measure of the perpetual duration of the world, unfolds from 
the one, eternal Beginning. As a consequence of this ontology, temporal 
things are entirely other than the Beginning from which they are caused, 
and so Nicholas’ notion of the relationship of creature to Creator is not 
pantheistic. And yet, because the Beginning is the ratio essendi of all things 
possible- to- be- made (possibile- fieri) (§ 15 [h X/ 2b, 18;  885]), “that which is 
made in the order of time is existent [subsistens] per se in eternity” (§ 22 [h 
X/ 2b, 31; 888]).
Whereas De principio focuses on the relationship between timeless cre-
ation and the temporality of the existent world, Nicholas’ nearly impene-
trable concern in De aequalitate is to explain how it can be possible that 
the human soul “sees that it itself is timeless time (intemporale tempus)”; 
“that it itself is not eternity, since it is time, although it is time timelessly”; 
that it “sees itself, above temporal things and on the horizon of eternity” (§ 
11 [h X/ 1 15; 848]); and, most enigmatically of all, that it sees itself as “unde-
limited conceptual delimitation without otherness” (§ 10 [h X/ 1, 14; 847]). 
What Nicholas seems to have in mind by these definitions of the soul’s 
intemporale tempus is that when we strive to conceive eternity— which is 
beyond naming, beyond discourse, and beyond comprehension— we arrive 
at an image of eternity in the notion of the world’s perpetual duration as 
an unfolding of the eternal Beginning that is presupposed as its cause. The 
reasoning behind this is rooted in Nicholas’ assertion that “in general, an 
external thing that is knowable [is knowable] by means of something inter-
nal that is consubstantial with [the rational soul]” (§ 6 [h X/ 1, 10; 845]), and 
that therefore:
By an intuitive seeing, the soul illumines and measures all things through 
itself; and by means of conceptual truth it judges the truth in different 
things. And by means of the truth which it finds to be present in different 
ways in different things, it is directed unto itself, in order to view within 
itself— truly and stably and without otherness— the truth which it has 
seen existing in different ways in different things, so that within it itself, 
as in a mirror- of- truth, it may see all things conceptually and may recog-
nize that it itself is the notion of all things. (§ 9 [h X/ 1 13; 847])
Thus, on the one hand, when the soul considers itself from the standpoint of 
its relationship to its own cause, it must see itself as a likeness of eternity. This 
is borne out in § 14, which offers a more philosophically abstract articulation 
of the point that Nicholas makes in the second part of the geographer meta-
phor that I discussed in the introduction. Nicholas writes:
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When [the soul] understands the fact that it enfolds all things concep-
tually, or assimilatively, and understands that its own conception is not 
the reason or cause (rationem seu causam) of things’ really being that 
which they are, it would turn to seeking, by means of itself, the Cause of 
both it itself and all other things and would say [to itself]: “In the Cause 
of myself— a Cause that shines forth within myself qua caused, so that 
I am a conceptual enfolding of the world— there is, necessarily, the es-
sential and eternal enfolding of all causable things. [These are present 
in my Cause] as in each and every thing’s most adequate Ground both of 
being and of knowing. In the likeness of this Universal Cause, I partake 
(by its gift) of intellectual being, which consists in a universal likeness of 
the Universal Cause both of being and of knowing. For in myself there 
shines forth the rational power (virtus rationalis) of that Cause’s univer-
sality and omnipotence, so that when I view myself as its image, then by 
means of contemplation I can approach it more nearly through a tran-
scending of myself. For in order to see myself amid all the things [in my 
conceptual world], I remove otherness from them all. But in order to be 
able to see my Cause, I must take leave of myself as caused and as image; 
otherwise, I will not arrive at the Living Ground (vivam rationem) of my 
reason.” (h X/ 1, 19- 20; 850- 51)
But even though the soul may pursue an understanding of itself as an expres-
sion of a transcendent universal cause, Nicholas is also clear that the tools 
through which we might wish to pursue such an understanding do not pro-
vide us with the means of fully achieving any such comprehension since, as 
the cardinal explains in De ludo globi, “we conceive of eternity only in terms of 
duration” (ii, § 88 [h ix, 108; 1228]). That is, even in our most comprehensive 
moments of understanding we must cut off from the Beginning some par-
ticular determinate ratio that provides only a partial understanding of that 
which is caused from the Beginning. Consequently, as Nicholas puts it in De 
principio:
Although [each being] cannot comprehend That which it desires so 
ardently, nevertheless it is not totally ignorant of it but knows most 
certainly that That which it desires exists. Moreover, the intellectual 
nature which knows that That [which it desires] exists and is incom-
prehensible, sees that it itself is more perfect the more incomprehen-
sible it knows to be That [which it desires]. For the Incomprehensible 
is approached by way of this knowledge of one’s ignorance. (§ 29 [h X/ 
2b, 41- 42; 892])
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In short, Nicholas’ view that the soul is the image of eternity counterintuitive-
ly entails the conclusion that human intellect operates in a flux, unfolding— 
through an ongoing dialogue with itself— the meaning of its internal represen-
tations of what it imagines to be external to it. However, since our intellectual 
possibilities are necessarily limited, we are, ironically, most aware of how our 
intellect is an image and likeness of eternity only when we are also attentive to 
the limited, all- too- human nature of our own comprehension.
Nicholas also conceives this structure of human thinking as the source of 
the “freedom” that was mentioned by the archangel in the supplication in De 
pace fidei— the only sort of freedom by which we may be said to possess a ca-
pacity to develop an understanding of ourselves. This is a freedom located in 
privation rather than the mere absence of compulsion for two reasons. First, 
as Nicholas explains in De venatione sapientiae, no created thing exhausts the 
perfection of its species:
Since what- is- made is subsequent to the possibility- of- being- made, it is 
never made in such a way that the possibility- of- being- made is exhaus-
tively delimited in it. For although the possibility- of- being- made (accord-
ing as it exists actually) is delimited, nevertheless it is not unqualifiedly 
delimited. For example, in Plato the possibility of being made a man is 
delimited; but the possibility of being made a man is not exhaustively 
delimited in Plato. Rather, there is only that delimiting mode which is 
called platonic; and countless other, more perfect modes remain [out-
side of Plato]. But even in Plato the possibility of being made a man is 
not [exhaustively] delimited; for a man can be made to be many things 
which Plato was not: e.g., a musician, a geometer, a mechanic. (§ 37.108 
[h xii, 101; 1345]).
Second, even were we to assume that Plato could at least maximize his own 
Platonic nature, Nicholas also maintains in De aequalitate that our soul “sees 
that because of its imperfection, it needs instruments and temporal succession 
in order to come from potentiality to actuality” (§ 11 [h X/ 1, 16; 848- 49]). Never-
theless, while this kind of freedom is a consequence of privation, it is only in 
this kind of freedom that we have the capacity to find or create ourselves. In 
Nicholas’ speculative treatises, the clearest expression of this point that I can 
think of is in  chapter 7 of De visione Dei (1453),
O Lord, the Sweetness of every delight, you have placed within my free-
dom that I be of my own if I am willing. Hence, unless I am my own, you 
are not mine, for you would necessitate [necessitares] my freedom since 
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you cannot be mine unless I also am mine. And since you have placed 
this in my freedom, you do not necessitate [necessitas] me, but you wait 
for me to choose to be my own. This depends on me and not on you, O 
Lord, for you do not limit your maximum goodness but lavish it on all 
who are able to receive it … You teach me that sense should obey reason 
and that reason should be lord and master. When, therefore, sense serves 
reason, I am my own. [But one does not have reason from which one is 
directed] except through you, O Lord, who are the Word and the Reason 
of reasons. I see now that if I listen to your Word, which does not cease to 
speak in me and which continually shines forth in my reason, I will be my 
own, free and not the slave of sin. (7, § 25- 26 [h vi, 27])25
Still, even if it is more obscure than De visione Dei’s exploration of the ethical 
consequences of this hermeneutic conception of human freedom, De aequal-
itate provides a more refined discussion of how it is that the tools with which 
each of us is capable of understanding may be more or less attenuated to ratios 
that explain the harmonies that may be perceived in the relationships between 
external things as they exist in time— and it is this point that will be my path-
way back to the question of De pace fidei’s reflection on the question of the le-
gitimacy of particular manifestations of self- understanding that are expressed 
through various religions as well as attitudes toward the religions of others. In 
section 11, for instance, Nicholas notes that:
But [our soul] sees that one man’s soul, being more united to the contin-
uous and to time, or succession, arrives more slowly at an understanding, 
whereas another’s soul arrives more quickly, because it is less immersed 
in the continuous. This latter soul more quickly frees itself [from time, or 
succession], since it has more suitable instruments for its operation; and 
it attains [an understanding] more precisely. (h X/ 1, 16; 848)
As I noted in the introduction, in sections 15- 19 Nicholas develops this point in 
order to discuss why it is that mastery in any art or science is the consequence 
of the soul’s ability to discern a ratio that allows it to delight in and, in the 
 25 Trans. H.  Lawrence Bond in Nicholas of Cusa:  Selected Spiritual Writings (Mahwah, 
NJ:  1997), p.  247. Translation altered:  in this passage, Bond has “constraint” for necessi-
tas, but Nicholas seems to be speaking of the kind of necessity that Thomas Aquinas, for 
instance, would call “absolute” or “natural” necessity, which is not a form of constraint 
or compulsion. Nicholas may also have in mind the same peculiar relationship between 
freedom and necessity that Boethius explores in Consolation of Philosophy.
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case of practical activities, produce harmonious relationships between exter-
nal things. And though the text does not explicitly discuss the question of how 
to produce harmony in one’s own soul, it may not be too much of a stretch to 
suggest that Nicholas’ understanding that the soul must poietically produce 
rather than simply perceive harmonies strongly implies an ethical imperative. 
After all, if I am who I am because I am capable of a dialogue with myself, and 
if I must also live with myself as the agent responsible for my actions, then 
I should certainly strive to be a good dialogical partner for myself and for oth-
ers insofar as it is within my power to do so.26
iii True Faith as a Poietic Pursuit of Wisdom
Leaving aside the oblique angle through which Nicholas approaches this eth-
ical dimension in the speculative writings, I may now turn more straightfor-
wardly to spelling out the tacit consequences of the philosophy of history that 
I have been discussing for the question of the legitimacy of religious rites and 
beliefs. As I have argued elsewhere,27 the philosophy of history articulated in 
these later speculative works allows us to reexamine De pace fidei’s notion that 
there is but one religion expressed through a variety of distinct rites in light of 
what appears to be an abandonment of any univocal conception of creation in 
favor of one that gives rise to a notion of the human soul as always seeking and 
producing itself as an image and likeness of an absconded God. In other words, 
according to Nicholas’ late works, all historical events, insofar as they are the 
unfolding of the eternal Beginning, are conceptually linked to the significance 
of the Incarnation— but, as we have just seen, these conceptual links can only 
ever be historically unique signs (or interpretations) of the Incarnation.28 
Thus, to the extent that one might speak of an arche or eschaton, these later 
 26 I am thinking of Hannah Arendt’s “Thinking and Moral Considerations,” Social Research 
38 (1971), 417- 46, especially her discussion (pp. 438- 46) of why, on Socrates’ account in the 
Gorgias, it is better to suffer than to do wrong.
 27 “ ‘But following the literal sense …,” pp. 14- 15.
 28 It is not clear to me that Nicholas was entirely aware of some of the implications I am 
drawing from my interpretation of these late works. However, I am not alone in thinking 
that in his later speculative writings there is a distinct shift in Nicholas’ philosophy of his-
tory away from the concordist eschatology that Bernard McGinn discusses in his essay for 
this volume. For instance, Mathieu van der Meer argues that in both his sermons and his 
speculative writings, Nicholas’ Christology is linked to an explicit eschatology only until 
about 1455, at which point he stops discussing the question of the last days altogether 
(“World without End,” p. 321).
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treatises imply that one may speak only of an eternal referent for any tempo-
ral activity whatsoever. Or, as Nicholas puts it in De possest (1460), there is no 
contradiction between the claim that “eternity as a whole is at once present at 
every point of time” and the claim that “God as the Beginning and the End is at 
once and as a whole present in all things” (§ 19 [h xi/ 2, 25; 924]). Consequently, 
each and every historical unfolding derives its legitimacy as a manifestation of 
true faith solely as a function of its awareness of itself as a manifestation of the 
Incarnation, an “event” that is both unfolded in time and yet also enfolds the 
meanings of all other histories of temporal events. Nevertheless, because of 
the multiplicity of existent, individuated souls, the meaning of the history of 
Incarnation is not the product of a stable referent but of an unstable one. Rath-
er, to be more precise, the ultimate referent for the meaning of any contingent 
history remains an Incarnative Beginning that is beyond comprehension, but 
this Beginning, precisely because it is beyond comprehension, does not itself 
provide a univocal determination of the intelligibility of any particular range 
of history from which one might seek meaning. There are, in short, multiple 
histories, and each history provides a unique hermeneutic frame of reference 
within which a soul produces itself as an image of what is presupposed as the 
same underlying but otherwise inaccessible Incarnational origin. To borrow 
from a previously cited passage from De ludo globi ii, § 94 (h ix, 117; 1232), a be-
lief might be thought of as a lyre, that is, as an instrument which measures and 
represents various harmonies expressed in time. But although one lyre may be 
more harmoniously constructed than another, equally harmonious lyres may 
be constructed with different numbers of strings and tunings. Further, even if 
there could be a single, maximally harmonious five- string lyre, it would not be 
a maximally harmonious seven- string lyre. In other words, (a) even if we as-
sume, as Nicholas does in De pace fidei, that all particular religions can be pre-
supposed to be unique expressions of the self- same Incarnational metaphysics 
out of which the human mind may produce more or less harmonious ratios for 
its self- understanding, (b)  it remains the case that all religions are rooted in 
their own irreducibly unique historical frames of reference. Therefore: (c) even 
though some religions will be more apt than others to encourage poietic pro-
duction under any given set of circumstances, (d) nevertheless, no particular 
religion can claim universal legitimacy.
Nevertheless, this claim does not entail the conclusion that we must there-
fore tolerate all religions that differ from our own. First, and most obviously, 
those who insist on the universal legitimacy of their own religion are funda-
mentally mistaken about the very nature of the beings for whom religions are 
the product of poietic expression and the hermeneutic frameworks within 
which all varieties of mental activities occur. I think this is precisely why even 
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though the views that Nicholas attributes to St Paul in De pace fidei about cir-
cumcision, the sacrament of marriage, and other religious rites may rest on an 
understanding of human nature that many contemporary Cusanus scholars 
would not easily endorse, it is nevertheless worth noting that Nicholas’ por-
trayal of Paul at least makes an appeal to a conception of human nature that 
Paul evidently assumes he shares with the other fictional interlocutors in the 
dialogue rather than to the mere personal certainty that the religious rites that 
he prefers have been directly and transparently ordained by God in opposition 
to social practices that would be grounded in rites that originate under differ-
ent historical conditions.
Here, it may be worth noting that the question of De pace fidei’s audience 
may be relevant to how we interpret the text. Given that the text was written 
in Latin, we can suppose that it is not a dialogue written with the intention 
of converting non- Christians to Christianity, nor even of convincing non- 
Christians that there is a unity of faith underlying diverse rites. Although the 
scene that unfolds for the reader is one in which non- Christians are won over 
to the point of view of Christians, perhaps the purpose of the dialogue may 
be more fruitfully understood as aiming to win over Christians to a particular 
reading of their own theology— to provide a criticism and corrective to Chris-
tian theology even while offering an apologetic defense of that reformed theol-
ogy. Moreover, even while Nicholas pays significant attention to non- Christian 
rites, as Paul Richard Blum points out, most of the contributions to the dia-
logue actually come from “representatives of dissent within the Christian cul-
ture.”29 Read in light of these considerations, De pace fidei suggests that, on the 
basis of an interpretation of the basic tenets of Christianity itself, Christians 
should strive to accommodate rites that differ from their own (whether of non- 
Christians or of other Christians) in the interests of achieving peace because 
it is only under conditions of peace that one has the leisure to turn to a con-
sideration of oneself as an image and likeness of a Beginning that is beyond all 
temporality.
Still, Nicholas’ incarnational metaphysics does not oblige us to tolerate 
those who believe that their own religious preferences are the only or even the 
most universally legitimate manifestations of faith; instead, we should note 
that the epistemic disadvantage of holding beliefs in this manner is likely to 
contribute to an ethical and political sensibility of entrenchment on any of 
a number of other matters. Consequently, we may say that, for Nicholas, reli-
gions have more or less legitimacy as expressions of true faith the more or less 
 29 Blum, “Truth, Violence, and Peace,” p. 34.
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they are capable of producing epistemic advantages for those who hold them 
and those who can be persuaded to accept them. However, if my interpretation 
is defensible, then Nicholas’ philosophy of history also suggests that, where the 
ethical and political legitimacy of religious beliefs and practices is concerned, 
the manner in which we maintain our beliefs is far more relevant than the 
content of the beliefs or the circumstances of their historical inception. Con-
tent and historical inception are not wholly irrelevant, of course, since both 
of these tend to have a relationship to the manner in which a person holds 
a belief. However, it is the manner of the holding of the belief that requires 
justification in the scheme we have seen. Faith is only a true faith when it is a 
faith seeking understanding, and the legitimacy of faith as a poietic pursuit of 
wisdom is not ascertained by assessing the content of a religion in isolation of 
the question of the hermeneutic consequences of the manner in which one 
relates to that religion’s central beliefs and practices. Rather, the question of 
the legitimacy of religious rites and beliefs concerns whether or not the ra-
tio expressed by one’s religious practices are harmonious or not, and, on the 
whole, harmonious practices are those that can be deployed as a tool for the 
production and development of other such practices. In other words, true faith 
is whatever manner of religious practices fosters or develops the pursuit of 
wisdom, and the only legitimate religious manifestations of true faith are prac-
tices that stimulate further inquiry and self- examination.30
It is in this respect that De pace fidei might be understood as offering reasons 
to be modest in our ecumenical ambitions— lest we deny differences that our 
interlocutors would prefer that we recognize— and moderate in our apologetic 
inclinations— lest we illegitimately confuse our opinions with the truths that 
these opinions help make meaningful for us in guiding our ethical practices. 
In short, a hopeful reading of De pace fidei would be one that treats the text 
as offering a reason to believe that many possible harmonies may be found 
between the multiple histories of the world and that we therefore also have 
a good reason to treat our own histories as occasions to produce these har-
monies by subjecting our own beliefs to a scrutiny that is even more rigorous 
than that which we employ in the interpretation of beliefs whose histories we 
regard as different than our own.
 30 Some atheists clearly believe that all religions tend to inhibit inquiry and self- examination. 
Although I am skeptical of that as a categorical claim, I should note that it remains an 
open question for me whether or not it is possible to have a “true faith” that is not partial 
to any particular religious practices— or, in other words, a faith that is not constructed on 
the basis of conviction regarding the veracity of revealed knowledge.
